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NOTE
TRUTH-IN-LENDING: JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF
THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION
Congress adopted the Truth-in-Lending Act1 in order "to assure
a meaningful disclosure of credit terms"2 to the consumer obligor s
One method adopted to accomplish this goal4 was to give to the con-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
R. CLONTZ, JR., TRuTH-iN-LENDING MANUAL (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL];
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES (1973) [hereinafter cited as D. DOBBS];
Burstein, There's Truth in Lending, But Is There Right in Rescission?, 2 REAL ES-
TATE REV. 83 (Summer 1972) [hereinafter cited as Burstein].
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970). The Act was
implemented by Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974). See
generally Garwood, Truth in Lending-A Regulator's View, 29 Bus. LAWYER 193
(1973); Kintner, Henneberger & Neill, A Primer on Truth in Lending, 13 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 501 (1969); Tanner, Truth in Lending and Regulation Z-A Primer, 6 GA. ST.
B.J. 19 (1969); Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 89 (1970); Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lending Act:
The Relationship Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REv. 199 (1971).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). The Act requires disclosure in clear and conspicuous
language so that the consumer can make an informed choice between alternative credit
terms. See id. § 1631; Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1191, 1193
(D.D.C. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); 114 CONG. Rac. 1615 (1968) (remarks of Representative Helstoki).
3. The consumer is "the party to whom credit is offered or extended. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970). Section 1635, however, uses the word "obligoer" to describe
the person contracting the debt. Id. § 1635.
4. The Act provides several means of enforcement, some of which are designed to
penalize the non-disclosing creditor and others of which afford relief to the consumer.
A civil penalty, for example, is authorized by the following language:
(a) [A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
this chapter . . . with respect to any person is liable to such person in an
amount equal to the sum of-(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the
failure;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any
finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that the lia-
bility under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1000 . . . . Pub. L. No. 89-320, § 408 (Oct. 28, 1974), amending
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
Earlier decisions characterized this civil liability as being remedial in nature and
required the consumer to elect between pursuing this remedy or rescinding the contract.
In Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970), for example, the court
stated that "the civil liability section is remedial rather than punitive in nature ...."
1227
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:1227
sumer the right to rescind a credit agreement5 if the creditor fails to
disclose information required by the Act. This right applies to those
transactions where a security interest is created in "the residence of
the person to whom the credit is extended . . ," Unlike common
Id. at 878. This, in turn, led the court to require election of remedies since "a remedy
of rescission is inconsistent with a remedy based on a theory of affirmance of the transac-
tion and. . . an election of the former constitutes an abandonment of the latter ... .
Id. at 877. See also Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Other courts, however, have concluded that section 1640 operates as
a penalty on the creditor and have avoided the doctrine of election of remedies. See,
e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376 (1973); Eby v. Reb
Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[I]f the civil liability provision is
. . . viewed as penal and not remedial, t is not inconsistent with a right of rescission
since civil liability is not then aimed at making the borrower whole."). For a discussion
of the doctrine of election of remedies, see D. DonsS § 1.5. See generally Comment,
supra note 1; 1971 U. TOLEDO L. Rnv. 573. The original Act did not include any pro-
vision for actual damages. It is possible, therefore, that the issue of election of remedies
will endure. considerable litigation before being finally settled, since the damages section
of the recent amendment once more raises the question of whether the civil relief is re-
medial or penal.
In addition to the civil penalty, the Act also provides that "in the case of any suc-
cessful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court" may be awarded. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (2) (1970). It is apparently within the court's discretion to determine the num-
ber of billable hours reasonably attributable to the case as well as the hourly rate which
is billed. See, e.g., Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255, 1262 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); Ljepya v. M.L.S.C. Properties, 353 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
The criminal penalty provides for a fine of not more than $5,000 and/or imprison-
ment not to exceed one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970). It applies to whoever will-
fully and knowingly
(1) gives false or inaccurate information or fails to provide information which
he is required to disclose under the provisions of this subchapter or any regu-
lation issued thereunder,
(2) uses any chart or table authorized by the Board under section 1606 of this
title in such a manner as to consistently understate the annual percentage rate
determined under section 1606(a) (1) (A) of this title, or(3) otherwise fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this sub-
chapter. Id.
The Act requires the United States Attorney General to submit an annual report
to Congress regarding his enforcement of the Act and any recommendations that he may
have. Id. § 1613. Attorney General Kleindienst reported that in 1972 only four per-
sons were indicted for violations of the Act. 1 TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANuL I, 3.08[2],
at 3-140 (1973). One commentator has suggested that there will be few prosecutions
under the Act because it is "practically impossible to 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt'
that the average small creditor was either 'willful or knowing' as to the complex require-
ments on which he is impaled under the Act and Regulation Z." Id. 3.08[1], at
3-138.
5. The Act extends the right of rescission "until midnight of the third business day
following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required
... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970). This provision also makes the creditor's security
interest void after the consumer has exercised his right to rescind. Id. § 1635(b).
6. Id. § 1635(a).
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law rescission, 7 the Act provides that the consumer can exercise his
right to rescind the contract without first tendering the consideration
that he has received." While this literal interpretation of the Act has
been applied in one line of cases,9 some recent decisions have judicially
modified the Act to the extent that a court is afforded the discretion
to require a consumer to tender the consideration before rescission of
the contract will be effective.'" Such conditional rescission will ap-
parently be ordered only when the consumer seeks both rescission and
a civil penalty" and when these two remedies in combination will "re-
sult in an unduly harsh penalty" to the creditor. 12  This Note will ex-
amine these different interpretations and suggest that the former is
preferable since it more effectively implements the intent of Con-
gress.13
DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL RuLEs
To understand how the Act changes the traditional sequence of
tender and rescission it is useful to review the nonstatutory rules that
ordinarily apply to a consumer-creditor relationship.
Traditional Rules. Generally, rescission results in the annullment
or abrogation of a contract 4 and should be accompanied by restitution
of the consideration exchanged in order to restore the parties to the
status quo ante.' 5 Restitution is an essential element of rescission,'0
7. See notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text.
8. "Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations [which are to be performed
after notice of rescission] under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to
the creditor . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970). See generally Comment, Truth in
Lending: Problems with the Right of Rescission, 7 WiLLAmETrE L.J. 119 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1974); Hank's Auto Sales,
Inc. v. Fisher, 38 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5, 310 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1974); Ljepya v.
M.L.S.C. Properties, 353 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
11. For a discussion of the civil penalty, see note 4 supra.
12. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974). The Palmer court fur-
ther stated:
The propriety of such a conditional decree of rescission . . . will depend on
the equities present in a particular case, as well as consideration of the legis-
lative policy of full disclosure that underlies the Truth in Lending Act and the
remedial-penal nature of the private enforcement provisions of the Act. Id.
For a discussion of guidelines to be used by a court in deciding whether or not to order
conditional rescission, see note 69 infra.
13. See notes 73-75 infra and accompanying text.
14. "Rescission as a general rule must be exercised in toto and is applied to the con-
tract in its entirety with the result that what has been done is wholly undone and no
contract provisions remain in force to bind either of the parties." Merickel v. Erickson
Stores Corp., 255 Minn. 12, 16, 95 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1959). See also 17 AM. JUR.
2d Contracts § 516, at 1002 (1964).
15. Restitution attempts to restore the parties to their original positions. See, e.g.,
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for in its absence one of the parties may be unjustly enriched on a void
contract.1 7  Therefore, rescission at law may be effected only if the
rescinding party makes an unconditional offer (tender) to return the
consideration that he received.' Once the rescinding party has given
notice of rescission and has tendered, the contract is void and the re-
scinding party may bring an action in replevin or assumpsit to have the
consideration that he has provided restored to him.19 The contract is
Medivox Prods. Inc. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 47, 256 A.2d 803
(1969) (rescission "is generally only available when the party seeking to rescind can
restore the other party to the status quo," id. at 75-76, 256 A.2d at 818, citing 17 AM.
Jun. 2d Contracts § 512, at 994 (1964)); E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 271
N.Y. 124, 127, 2 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1936); Evans v. Brubaker, 207 Okla. 42, 44, 247
P.2d 511, 513 (1952); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Shonka, 2 Utah 2d 223, 226, 272 P.2d
155, 156 (1954). See also S. WMLISTON, A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS §
1454, at 3-4 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1970). There are some minor exceptions to this general
rule that restitution is a prerequisite to rescission of a contract. See 17 AM. Jun. 2d
Contracts § 513, at 797 (1964).
16. "Restitution is an integral part of rescission and defendants cannot have the
benefits of rescission without assuming its responsibilities." Johnston v. Gilbert, 234
Ore. 350, 354, 382 P.2d 87, 89-90 (1963) (footnotes omitted). However, one commen-
tator has cautioned that "[t]o the extent that the law of restitution is a law of read-
justments, the principle against unjust enrichment furnishes a goal, but other principles
must be sought out and established to reach solutions to many of the problems." D.
DOBBS § 4.1, at 227.
17. The rescinding party is given the right to void a contract at law if, for example,
he is "defrauded or if he enters a contract under a basic mistake, or if his contract is
unenforceable at his option because of infancy or lack of a writing . . . ." D. DOBBS
§ 4.8, at 293 (footnotes omitted). See also S. WLLISTON, supra note 15, §§ 1454 et seq.
18. See 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 512, at 996 (1964). "[Iit has been held that
it is necessary, as a condition to bringing an action at law based on the rescission of a
contract, previously to return or tender bonds, mortgages, or mortgage certificates re-
ceived by the plaintiff as consideration." Id. § 515, at 1000. This rule is not univer-
sally favored and one commentator has suggested that "much improvement would result
if the rigid rule of restoration were abandoned altogether ... " D. DOBBS § 4.8, at
297.
19. "The theory here is that the court has nothing to do with the rescission of the
transaction; that is accomplished by the plaintiff when he notifies the defendant and re-
turns what he received under the transaction." D. DOBBS § 4.8, at 293.
However, if the plaintiff is suing for rescission in equity, he does not have to make
restitution before commencing suit "[s]ince rescission is not accomplished 'in equity' un-
til the court so decrees." Id. at 294. See also Lightner v. Karnatz, 258 Mich. 74, 241
N.W. 841 (1932). This has been explained by one commentator in the following man-
ner:
Many of the courts have, in dealing with this question, completely lost sight
of the plain distinction between the equitable remedy of rescission or cancella-
tion ...and the legal remedies, based upon rescission of a contract by the
act of a party thereto, where, in the act of rescission itself, the plaintiff must
restore or attempt to restore the consideration, since, in legal theory, the ex
parte act of rescission reinvests him with the legal title to the thing for the
possession of which he subsequently sues, and must, therefore, be conditioned
upon a surrender of the thing already received by him in pursuance of the
transaction which he thus avoids. 5 J. POMEROY, PoMEo's EQuny Junis-
PRUDENCE AND EQUITABL REMEDIES § 2110, at 4765 (2d ed. 1919).
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rescinded at law without a court decree; judicial action is necessary only
to assist the rescinding party in recovering his property. In order to
rescind a contract by his own act, however, a party must have a substan-
tive basis for doing so-that is, the contract must be voidable.
Assume, for example, that a consumer purchased storm windows
costing $2,000 and that he paid for them by check. Shortly thereafter,
he discovered that the contract was voidable,20 rescinded the agree-
ment by returning -the windows to the seller, and demanded restoration
of his payment. If the seller accepted the storm windows but refused
to return the money paid, -the consumer could bring an aotion at law
to recover his property, but he would be at a serious disadvantage. He
not only would have lost the use of the storm windows and his money,
but he would also bear the risk that by the time he obtains an enforce-
able judgment 'the seller may no longer be solvent. Furthermore, the
burden of bringing suit would fall entirely on the consumer, who must
assume litigation expenses if he is to recover any of the consideration
that he has paid.
Statutory Departure from Traditional Rules. The Truth-in-
Lending Act provides the consumer with a new substantive basis for
voiding a credit agreement21 and reorders the sequence of rescission
and tender.22  If the buyer of the storm windows purchased the goods
on credit23 and extended to the creditor a second mortgage on his res-
20. See note 17 supra.
21. See note 31 infra. The provisions of section 1635 are also incorporated in sec-
tion 5.204 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1974).
See also Burstein 90.
23. The provisions of section 1635 (rescission) are triggered only if it is first de-
termined that a credit transaction has occurred. The Act provides:
(e) The term "credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor
to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.(f) The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or
arrange for the extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge
is required. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e), (f) (1970); see 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(1)
(m) (1974).
Similarly, Regulation Z provides:
(k) "Consumer credit" means credit offered or extended to a natural per-
son, in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the trans-
action is primarily for personal, household, or agricultural purposes and for
which either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an
agreement, is or may be payable in more than four installments. Id. § 226.1
(k) (emphasis added);
see Young v. Tri-City Remodeling Enterprises, Inc., 335 N.Y.S.2d 308 (City CL Al-
bany 1972).
The authority of the Federal Reserve Board to establish the "more than four install-
ments" rule was challenged in Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356
(1973). In that case, the district court entered summary judgment for the purchaser
of a magazine subscription under a thirty-month installment contract since the disclosure
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idence as security,2 4 the transaction would be subject to the disclosure
requirements of the Act. If the creditor failed to accurately report the
annual percentage rate of interest,2 5 for example, the consumer could
rescind the contract by simply giving the creditor notice of his intent
to rescind.28
requirements of the Truth-in-Lending Act were not met. This decision was sustained
by the Supreme Court in an opinion that characterized the "rule" as reasonably related
to the objective of preventing creditors from concealing finance charges in the cash
price.
In a series of Public Position Letters, the Board has clarified the terms used in Reg-
ulation Z. "Mihe term 'credit,' for the purposes of Truth-in-Lending, assumes a con-
tractual relationship voluntarily entered, between creditor and debtor." Excerpts from
FRB Letter of July 14, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder) CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUoD 1 30,107, at 66,045. Therefore, taxes and assessments levied by a municipality
are not within the meaning of the term. Excerpts from FRB Letter of Oct. 15, 1969,
No. 153, id. 30,494, at 66,221, Additionally, if one is not contractually bound to
make installment payments, the "credit" requirement is not met. Excerpts from FRB
Letter of June 3, 1969, id. 30,041, at 66,021-22. In order for credit, as used in the
Truth-in-Lending Act, to be extended, there must be a finance charge involved. Ex-
cerpts from FRB Letter of May 28, 1970, No. 337, id. 1 30,392, at 66,181-82 (an
option contract constitutes a credit transaction); Excerpts from FRB Letter of Mar.
13, 1970, No. 286, id. f 30,526, at 66,233 (a service charge or additional fee beyond
the purchase price of an item must be charged to the consumer in order for a lay
away plan to be subject to the Act); Excerpts from FRB Letter of July 8, 1969, No. 32,
id, 30,434, at 66,200-01 (professional groups who allow their patients or customers
to pay bills in more than four installments are subject to the Act if they require a
finance charge).
It should be pointed out, however, that the Act does not apply to casual loans if
the lender does not regularly make such loans, nor to enterprises that extend credit only
through the use of independent credit agencies such as Master Charge, American Ex-
press, or Diners' Club. See Kintner, Henneberger & Neill, supra note 1, at 502.
24. A security interest must be created in the consumer's residence in order for the
section to be applicable. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970). Excepted from the coverage
of this section, however, are first liens "against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of
that dwelling." Id. § 1635(e); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(g) (1974). This
exception extends to
(1) first liens, whether created, retained or assumed, used to finance acquisi-
tion of the residence in which the consumer resides or intends to reside;(2) first liens that are retained or acquired to finance construction of a new
house;(3) any subordinated lien that was exempt at the time it was created;(4) certain advances made for agricultural purposes. Id.
See also 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 1810, at 3193 (1974). But "[a]ll second
mortgages on the debtor's principal residence, along with many other liens such as
mechanics and materialmen's liens fall within the scope of the Act." Comment, supra
note 8, at 122.
25. See 15 U.S.C. §, 1606 (1970).
26. Id. § 1635(a). For this notice to be effective it must be in writing. I CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 1860, at 3202 (1974). If written notification is sent by
mail, it is deemed given when the instrument is placed in the mail box. If given by
telegraph, the notification is effective when the telegram is filed for transmission.
Other documentary notification is "given" when it arrives at the ¢reditor's place of busi-
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When a consumer, exercises his right to rescind under the Act,
any security interest extended to the creditor becomes void. Upon
notice of rescission, the creditor has ten days in which to return the
property he has received from -the consumer 28 and to "take any action
necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security inter-
est created under the transaction. 29  After the creditor performs these
statutory obligations, the consumer must tender the property he has re-
ceived pursuant to the contract 0
Under the Act, a consumer has more protection against deceptive
creditors than is provided by nonstatutory law. He is extended a new
substantive basis for rescinding a contract: the creditor's nondisclosure
of credit terms as required by the Act.31 Furthermore, the consumer can
ness. 1 TRuTH-mr-LENDiNG MANUAL ff 5.03[1], at 5-30 to 31. The form of the notice
that the creditor must give to the consumer of his right to rescind is set out more
extensively in 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b) (1974).
27. 15 U.SC. § 1635(b) (1970). Although this section of the Act requires the cre-
ation of a security interest in a residence, id. § 1635(a), it would appear that once this
threshold requirement is met all security interests created in that transaction would be-
come void upon rescission. Thus, if a consumer, in one transaction, gave the creditor
a security interest in his residence and his car, both security interests would become void.
28. Id. § 1635(b); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1974). It is also of
particular significance that "[w]hen a customer exercises his right to rescind . . . he
is not liable for any finance or other charge....... Id. It has been determined, for
example, that commitment fees received from the consumer are "finance charges" within
the meaning of section 1635. Excerpts from FRB Letter of April 17, 1970, [1969-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH CoNsuMmt CREDIT GUIDE 30,355, at 66,161. See also Ex-
cerpts from.FRB Letter of May 28, 1970, No. 337, id. I 30,392, at 66,181.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970).
30. The tender may be made "at the location of the property or at the residence
of the obligor, at the option of the obligor." Id. This would seem to place the burden
of retrieving the property on the creditor, since the creditor's failure to take possession
of the tendered property within ten days causes title to be vested in the consumer without
any obligation to pay for it. Id.; see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1974). This,
of course, raises the question of what happens if it is impossible for the creditor to take
possession-for example, if there were a blizzard. 1 TRUT-rN-LEDING MANUAL 1
5.03[5], at 5-35. No provision was made for "legal excuse," so apparently the title
would still vest in the consumer.
'It is unclear what the result would be if the contract expressly required that the
consumer had to return the property to the place of the creditor's business in order to
rescind the contract. The court would probably give effect to a tender of the property
at the residence of the creditor or at its location but assess damages against the consumer
for the cost of moving the property to the creditor's place of business.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1974).
A literal reading of the Act suggests that the consumer is provided two new sub-
stantive'grounds for rescinding a credit agreement. First, he is guaranteed the absolute
right to rescind within three business days following the consummation of the contract,
regardless of whether the creditor has complied with the disclosure iequiremefits. Sec-
ond, if the creditor has not made the proper disclosures, the consumer may rescind until
three days after disclosure is made. In other words, there are actually. two three-day
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effect rescission merely by notifying the creditor of his intent to do so. 2
If the creditor has not returned the consumer's property within ten days
after receiving notice of rescission, the consumer can sue for restoration
of his property. However, once the creditor has returned the consum-
er's property and cancelled the security interest, the consumer must
tender the creditor's consideration."3 Thus, the effect of the Act is
to shift the burden of performing first from the consumer to 'the credi-
tor. In addition, if the creditor does not take possession of the con-
sideration tendered by the consumer within ten days from the time
it is tendered, ownership of the property will vest in the consumer with-
out any further obligation on his part to pay for it.34  In general, the
provisions of the Act seem to represent a conscious attempt to place
the consumer in a much stronger bargaining position than he enjoys
under the traditional rules of rescission.
JUDICIAL CONDITIONS FOR RESCISSION
Some courts have been troubled by the favorable position in which
the Act places the consumer and have tempered the apparent unfair-
ness to the creditor by imposing nonstatutory conditions upon the con-
sumer's right to rescind.3 5 The first reported case in which a court
periods during which the consumer may rescind, instead of one. The first is truly a
"cooling-off" period. But the second, which arises only if the creditor discloses the re-
quired information after the initial three day period has run, is not a "cooling-off" period
at all. Instead, it serves as a remedial device to make the deceived consumer whole
again. There is no shopping around or comparison of alternative credit arrangements
during this period. However, it does work almost as a penalty on the creditor, while
relieving the consumer of an unwanted credit obligation. At a minimum, it encourages
creditors to disclose fully in compliance with the statute prior to consummation. By his
own efforts (in the form of disclosure in accordance with the terms of the Act), the
creditor may avoid rescission of the credit agreement and possible forfeiture of property
transferred thereunder. See generally Comment, Timing of Truth-in-Lending Disclo-
sures: A Dilemma for Mortgage Lenders, 58 IowA L. REv. 389 (1972), in which it
is suggested that disclosure should be made well before the consummation of a credit
transaction in order to "meaningfully utilize this credit information in bargaining nego-
tiations." Id. at 395.
32. But see Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
33. Thus, the consumer retains the property until tender is required. However, the
consumer may have to give the creditor a credit for the use of the creditor's property.
See Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1974) (amount returned to
consumer reduced by the rental value of the premises during the consumer's possession).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970). The Act is unclear as to whether there are any
limits on when the consumer can tender in order to start this forfeiture period running.
Case law has further confused this issue. See notes 110-14 infra and accompanying
text.
35. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974); Eby v. Reb Realty,




departed from a literal interpretation of the Act was Ljepya v. M.L.S.C.
Properties.6 In this case, borrowers brought suit seeking enforcement
of the Act on the basis that a mortgage broker had not properly dis-
closed that forty-eight percent of the principal amounts7 of a second
mortgage he had obtained for them was for commissions.3 8  The court
36. 353 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
37. The Act does not attempt to regulate finance charges or to interfere with trade
practices except to the extent that such practices may be inconsistent with its provisions.
See generally Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6(b), (c) (1974); Excerpts from FRB Let-
ter of April 20, 1972, No. 596, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDrr
GUIDE 30,840, at 66,367; H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 1
TRuTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL If 2.03, at 2-6; Tanner, supra note 1.
Consequently, the only significance of the forty-eight percent figure used here is
to show the materiality of the broker's nondisclosure. A second mortgage could have
been procured for a ten percent, rather than a forty-eight percent, commission to the
brokers "because of the demand for the property for development purposes" at that time.
353 F. Supp. at 867. This is precisely the type of practice that the disclosure require-
ments were intended to correct. A recurring theme in the congressional debates was
that the consumer has been historically subjected to the unscrupulous tactics of creditors
who would engage in practices which, if not fraudulent, were calculated to confuse con-
sumers. See 114 CONG. REc. 1611 (1968) (remarks of Representative Cahill). As was
explained by one Congressman:
What the consumer does need is to be told the truth in a form which is mean-
ingful to him. Significant truth in the area of credit terms for all transactions
presented in a uniform fashion, so that the consumer can compare credit terms
with the same ease that he is able to compare initial price. Id. at 1595 (re-
marks of Representative Halpern).
See generally Garwood, A Look at Truth In Lending-Five Years After, 14 SANTA
CLAR LAwYFR 491, 492-93 (1974). This purpose was explicitly stated in the Act itself:
"It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms avail-
able to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) (em-
phasis added). The Liepya court characterized the nondisclosure by the mortgage
broker as a "part of a deception to cover up an extortion and a conflict of interest" and
concluded that the Act was applicable. 353 F. Supp. at 868.
38. The facts of this case are somewhat complicated, but nevertheless essential to
a thorough understanding of the holding. The plaintiffs were owners of land valued at
$225,000, on which there was a first mortgage for $93,000. In 1971, they obtained a
second morgage of $18,000 from Arms, a real estate broker, who placed the mortgage
with one of his customers. When the plaintiffs were delinquent in paying interest on
the second mortgage, Arms obtained an assignment thereof from his customer and re-
corded a notice of default. Fearing that Arms was "scheming to foreclose" on them,
the plaintiffs went to Lopes to obtain a new second mortgage to pay off the existing sec-
ond mortgage. Lopes, a real estate agent, was acting as a representative of numerous
parties: (1) the plaintiffs; (2) his associate Paulson; (3) HLC and its parent company,
M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., which "were in the business of setting up trusts on mortgages
and disposing of participations in those trusts to individual beneficiaries." 353 F. Supp.
at 867. Lopes required of the plaintiffs a commission of $6,120 for HLC and $5,400
for Paulson. It was this dual commission of $11,520 that the court deemed improperly
disclosed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(2) (1970), which requires disclosure of
"[a]ll charges, individually itemized, which are included in the amount of credit ex-
tended but which are not part of the finance charge." This failure to disclose gave rise
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granted the maximum civil penalty and attorney fees but conditioned
rescission on tender by the obligors: "Plaintiffs [consumers] are en-
titled ,to rescission, upon repaying within ten days of judgment the
principal of the second mortgage loan .. . together with such sums
as . . . the second mortgagee has recently paid to the first mortgagee
... The court was untroubled by the fact that it had conditioned
rescission on tender, despite the language of the Act which seems to
provide to the contrary.40
The next case which judicially modified the express terms of the
Act was Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc.41 The Eby court held that a consumer
cannot be compelled to elect between exercising his right to rescind
the contract 42 and suing the creditor for a civil penalty;43 rather he may
seek both forms of relief at the same time.44  Although the court
avoided forcing the consumer to elect between a civil penalty'and re-
scission, it did qualify its opinion:
[W]e do not say that a court must always grant both forms of relief
when requested. These two separate provisions can result in a some-
times harsh penalty. In the absence of any clear congressional state-
ment, we think a request for both forms of relief is addressed to a court's
sense of equity and may be properly denied in appropriate cases. 45
The court viewed the question of whether or not both types of relief
should be granted as a matter of the trial court's "equitable discre-
to a cause of action under section 1635(b) because the consumer has a right to rescind
until there has been a "delivery of the disclosures required under this section and all
other material disclosures required under this part." Id. § 1635(a).
39. 353 F. Supp. at 868. There is no explanation whatever as to why the court
allowed the consumer only ten days from the date of judgment to make a tender to the
creditor. If the creditor's violations were as flagrant as the court suggested, see note
37 supra, it is strange that the court chose a ten day figure that is in no way imposed
by the Act.
40. "[W]ithin ten days after the receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall
return to the obligor any money or property given . . . . Upon the performance of- the
creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the cred-
itor . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970). This language implies that the only time
that the consumer must tender is after the creditor has fulfilled his obligations. This
point in time has to be after rescission because the creditor's obligations do not arise
until after rescission.
41. 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970).
43. Id. § 1640(a).
44. 495 F.2d at 651-52. Some courts consider the civil penalty to be a remedy and
apply the doctrine of election of remedies. See note 4 supra.
45. Id. at 652. In this case, a real estate brokerage firm was attempting to foreclose
a second mortgage that it had taken on the plaintiff's home as part of the broker's sale
to the plaintiff. The brokerage -firm failed to disclose the credit terms or the right of
rescission granted by the Act. Id. at 647.
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tion."'4  In this instance it concluded that the lower court had not
abused its discretion by awarding both rescission and the civil penalty.47
The Eby court did not consider the question of conditional rescis-
sion; however, it was the first court to judicially modify the Act by sub-
jecting the enforcement provisions to the "equitable discretion" of the
judiciary. 8  This modification was perhaps based on the well-recog-
nized principle that, in interpreting a statute, a court may depart from
a literal reading if its sense of equity and fair play so dictate.49  The
sense of equity is "synonymous with [interpreting the] 'spirit' or
'principle" of the statute.50  By departing from the precise terms of
a statute, courts attempt to give effect to the intent of the legislature
rather than to the language chosen to express that intent. 1 Generally,
such modification is appropriate where: (1) the language of the
statute is so narrow that it precludes application of the law to a situation
which the court believes the legislature intended it to reach; or (2)
the statutory language is so ambiguous that its literal interpretation
would seem to expand the coverage of the statute beyond that which
the legislature intended.52
The first test clearly does not justify the Eby court's modification
of the Act since the basic thrust of its decision serves to expand, rather
than narrow, the application of the enforcement provisions. By char-
acterizing the civil liability provisions of the Act58 as penal, the court
negated the rationale underlying election of remedies. The Eby court
stated, "[If the civil provision is so viewed as penal and not remedial,
it is not inconsistent with a right of rescission since civil liability is not
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id.
48. This dictum was relied upon in Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974),
wherein the court conditioned rescission on tender by the obligor.
49. 2A C. SANDS, SUH ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrON § 54.01, at 351 (4th ed.
1973). The court's sense of equity should not be confused with the procedures used
by a court of equity in dealing with rescission and restitution. See note 19 supra.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 54.03, at 356-58 nn.6-13.
52. Id.- § 54.04, at 358. The second of these principles is designed to limit the rem-
edy provided by the statute so that it will not work to effect a mischief not intended
by Congress..
[I]t also happens sometimes that people speak in imprecise generalities which
in conventional usage could reasonably be found to embrace more than there
is any purpose or reason to include. It is therefore a correlative of equitable
interpretation, in recognition of this insight about imprecision sometimes en-
countered in the use of language, that when there is doubt about how inclu-
sively a statute should be construed to apply, if the mischief that it was enacted
to remedy can be perceived it will be construed to apply only so far as is
needed in order to effectuate the remedy. Id.
53. I-5 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970). See note 4 supra.
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then aimed at making the borrower whole." 54  Instead, the court rea-
soned that both forms of relief were necessary to avoid undermining
the effectiveness of the Act.55
The second test for statutory modification was at least arguably
met since the Eby court found some ambiguity in the Act in that Con-
gress was silent as to whether the doctrine of election of remedies
should apply to the enforcement provisions.5 This reasoning is falla-
cious, however, since once the court determined that the drafters of
the Act intended the civil liability to work as a penalty, the doctrine
was inapplicable 7 and there was no necessity for Congress to address
this issue. The court further undermined this justification for modify-
ing the Act when it stated:
To the extent that only civil liability is pursued, the sanction against
unscrupulous homes sales practices is weakened. To the extent that
only rescission is chosen-where available-the penalty attendant upon
nondisclosure will be less severe and, consequently, the incentive to dis-
close is diminished. 8
The inference drawn from this statement is that enforcement of both
sections of the Act is important to the policies which Congress wished
to implement. Nevertheless, the Eby court suggested that there will
be situations when, using its equitable discretion, the trial court can
decline to enforce one of these provisions.59 This opinion, like the
54. 495 F.2d at 651, citing Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio
1970).
55. 495 F.2d at 652. It is ironic that the court justified modifications of the statute
by emphasizing the harshness of the two forms of relief since it premised the characteri-
zation of civil liability as a penalty on, inter alia, the necessity of severe enforcement
provisions:
[]t would undermine effectiveness of the Truth in Lending Act to require
borrowers to choose their remedies. The purpose of making creditors civilly
liable is to force disclosure of credit terms. The purpose of according borrow-
ers a right of rescission is broader; not only is it designed to compel disclosure,
but it also serves to blunt unscrupulous sales tactics by giving homeowners a
means to unburden themselves of security interests exacted by such tactics. Id.
56. Id. at 651.
57. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
58. 495 F.2d at 652.
59. The court's analysis suffers from the further defect that it failed to take account
of section 1640(c), which states:
A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under this section
for a violation of this chapter if the creditor shows by a preponderance of evi-
dence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide er-
ror notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
any such error. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1970).
This provision already seems to allow a creditor to escape an unjust application of this
section. The use of an equitable discretion doctrine seems to invite the trial court to
create other grounds upon which the creditor could avoid the application of the Act.
If Congress had meant for the creditor to have other ways to escape the enforcement
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one in Ljepya, seems to be an inappropriate judicial modification of
the Act.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed the "equitable dis-
cretion" language used in Eby6" when, in Palmer v. Wilson,6' it judi-
cially modified the Act by ordering conditional rescission. In Palmer,
a homeowners lending corporation extended credit to consumers 2
without making the necessary disclosures.6 3 The consumers brought
an action to recover the statutory penalty and to obtain enforcement
of their right of rescission.64 The district court awarded a civil penalty
of the Act, it could have enumerated them. Moreover, in some provisions of the Act,
Congress deliberately took a harsh attitude toward creditors. See, e.g., id. § 1635(b)
(creditor forfeits his consideration unless he reclaims it ten days after the consumer ten-
ders it).
60. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
61. 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Homeowners Loan Corporation extended a loan to the consumer in exchange
for a note in the amount of $9300 and a deed of trust securing the note. 359 F. Supp.
at 1100-01. This created the security interest in the consumer's residence necessary to
trigger the rescission provision. If, however, the consumer had not owned any real prop-
erty which was, or was expected to be, his principal residence at the time the credit
transaction was entered into, he would never thereafter be extended the right of rescis-
sion under section 1635. If an after-acquired residence were to trigger the right of
rescission, "the customer would obtain substantive rights that neither he nor the creditor
could reasonably anticipate at the time. . . ." Excerpts from FRB Letter of July 10,
1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDiT GUIDE 30,092, at 66,040.
Similarly, one must have a bona fide intent to live in a dwelling in order to call it his
residence for purposes of section 1635. See Excerpts from FRB Letter of March 22,
1972, No. 584, id. 30,824 at 66,360. For example, if one enters into a credit trans-
action whereby the security interest is in a condominium in which he is entitled to reside
for only thirty days of the year, significant questions arise as to business purpose and
intent. Id. These problems must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See generally
Burstein 85.
63. The lender failed to disclose in uniform terms, see 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970),
the total payments due under the credit agreement, see id. § 1639(a) (3), and the exact
amount financed by the transaction, see id. § 1639(a)(1). In addition, the consumers
were not notified of their right to rescind as required by the Act. See id. § 1635(a);
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1974). The court concluded that there was "no
question that defendants failed to make the required disclosures in proper form." 359
F. Supp. at 1101.
64. The homeowners mailed the defendant notice of rescission five and one half
months after they had signed a note and a deed of trust. 359 F. Supp. at 1101. Here-
tofore, most commentators and courts have concluded that the right of rescission con-
tinued indefinitely until such time as the required disclosures were made. See, e.g., Pal-
mer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated on other grounds,
502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974); Garwood, supra note 37, at 497 n.34; Comment,
supra note 1, at 202; Note, Consumer Protection-Disclosure of Cognovit Provisions as
Security Interests Under the Truth in Lending Act, 51 N.C.L. REv. 874, 876 (1973).
A recent amendment, however, has imposed a statute of limitations on the right of
rescission:
(f) An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date
of consummation of the transaction or upon sale of the property, whichever
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and attorney fees and ordered enforcement of the rescission. 65 The
court reasoned: "By sending their notice [of rescission] to defendants
[creditors], plaintiffs [consumers] did all that was required of them.
Defendant's claim that along with the notice plaintiffs ought to have
tendered the money loaned them is expressly rejected [by the
Act] . . .,.
When the case was heard on appeal, the creditor argued that re-
scission had been improperly granted because the homeowners had not
tendered the money loaned to them at the time they elected to rescind
the agreement.( 7  Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit found
merit in this argument:
[W]hen an obligor seeks to enforce his -right of rescission, as well as
to recover the statutory penalty and attorney fees, it is within the district
court's equitable poWer to grant both forms of relief, but to condition
enforcement of the rescission order on the debtor's tender of the princi-
pal of the loan received from the creditor. The propriety of such a con-
ditional decree of rescission, of course, will depend on the equities
present in a particular case, as well as consideration of legislative policy
68
The appellate court vacated the district court's judgment and "[re-
manded] the case for consideration of the propriety of conditioning the
grant of rescission on repayment by the [consumers].""9
occurs earlier, notwithstanding the fact that the disclosures required under this
section or any other material disclosures required under this chapter have not
been delivered to the obligor. Pub. L. No. 89-320, § 405 (Oct. 28, 1974),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970).
65. 359 F. Supp. at 1104; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
66. 359 F. Supp. at 1102. This literal interpretaion of the statute has been recog-
nized by other commentators. 'Melvin L. Burstein, General Counsel of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis, noted that "[b]ecause of the midnight deadline [on the third
business day of the rescission period], the Task Force concluded that Congress intended
for the most part, rescission shall take effect at the time notice is dispatched." Burstein
90. See also Kintner, Henneberger & Neill, supra note 1, at 526; Comment, supra note
8, at 132. It should be noted, however, that these interpretations were offered without
the benefit of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.
1974).
67. The creditor also argued that the plaintiff should have to elect between rescis-
sion and the civil penalty. Relying on Eby, the Palmer court rejected this contention.
502 F.2d at 861.
In addition, the creditor suggested that his failure to disclose was excused as an un-
intentional and bona fide error excused by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1970). The court re-
jected this argument, stating: "The defendant's omissions and mislabeling of terms were
not the result of clerical errors, which are the only violations this section was designed
to excuse." 502 F.2d at 861, citing Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F.
Supp. 270, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
68. 502 F.2d at 862.
69. Id. The lower court was left in a true dilemma as to what test should be eni-
ployed in determining whether or not to grant rescission. Presumably, when the Ninth
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This judicial modification of the Act is difficult to justify. The
opinion of Judge Wright, concurring in part and dissenting in part, is
better reasoned: "Although the remedy [of rescission] might be
harsh, it is the one Congress adopted, and I would not substitute our
judgment for its."' 70  A literal interpretation of the Act would suggest
that any security interest created by a credit agreement is void as soon
as the consumer notifies the creditor of his intent to rescind2' If, on
the other hand, rescission is not effective until tender by the obligor,
the security interest of the creditor remains in force until such time
as the consumer returns that which is the subject of the agreement.
Judge Wright observed: "This is in direct conflict with § 1635(b).
Indeed, conditioning the voiding of a security interest on repayment
is effectively no remedy at a0l because, after repayment, the security
interest has fulfilled its purpose and has lost its vitality. '72
The court cannot justify its modification of the Act on the basis
that the Act's terms are so narrow that they fail to reach situations con-
templated by Congress since conditional rescission limits the enforce-
ment provisions even further than a literal interpretation. 73  Similarly,
as Judge Wright suggested, the language of the Act is not so ambiguous
as to cause the prescribed statutory relief to be extended beyond the
scope anticipated by the drafters. 4 Instead, the Act vests an immed-
Circuit referred to the "equities" of the case, id., it intended to achieve a balancing of
the amount of "harshness" to each party. The court cited the Eby decision for the
proposition that a civil penalty and rescission of the contract "can sometimes result in
an unduly harsh penalty" to the creditor. Id. On the other hand, it suggested that the
obligors may be ordered to restore the creditors' consideration in accordance with a plan
that would take account of the obligor's "current financial situation." Id. at 863. At
best, the district court may infer from the concurring opinion of Judge Thompson
that conditional rescission should be ordered only if the consumer will experience an
economic "windfall" at the expense of the creditor. Id. at 864. This, of course, is still
ambiguous, thus subjecting this test to the lower court's sense of justice and fairness.
Another test the Ninth Circuit suggested would be appropriate was whether the leg-
islative policy of full disclosure is being effectively pursued. While the Eby decision
might suggest that the enforcement provisions of the Act will be effective only if they
are severe, see text accompanying note 58 supra, the lower court is placed in the unten-
able position of determining what degree of harshness is necessary to induce creditors
to comply with the Act. Should this criteria be measured against the particular creditor
involved or against creditors as a whole?
70. 502 F.2d at 864 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
72. 502 F.2d at 863 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
74. It is well recognized that
general and comprehensive legislation, prescribing minutely a course of conduct
to be pursued and the parties and things affected, and specifically describing
limitations and exceptions, is indicative of a legislative intent that the statute
should totally supersede and replace common law dealing with the subject mat-
ter. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 49, § 50.05, at 281 (4th ed. 1973).
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iate right of rescission in the consumer if his residence is used as col-
lateral in certain credit transactions. 75  Thus, the Palmer court's deter-
mination that the disclosure requirements of the Act had been violated
should have been sufficient to affirm the consumer's substantive jus-
tification for voiding the contract. Its only remaining responsibility
would then have been to order the restoration of the rescinding party's
property.
Furthermore, it is particularly surprising that the Ninth Circuit
would modify the terms to dilute the rights of the consumer since the
rescission provision has been consistently characterized as remedial in
nature, and it is the usual practice of the courts to give a liberal inter-
pretation to such statutes.7 6  Thus, even if the court were to find some
ambiguity in the Act, normal rules of construction would suggest that
the court should expand, rather than narrow, the Act's remedial effects.
See also S. EDGAR, CRAIES ON STATUTE LAw 336-37 (6th ed. 1963). The briefest in-
spection of section 1635, together with the implementing provisions of Regulation Z,
would leave no doubt that the statute itself is quite precise in providing for the sequence
of events that take place in rescission of a credit agreement and, in that respect, departs
from common law. The sequence of rescission and tender provided by the common law
is reversed by the Truth-in-Lending Act and there is no reasonable explanation for rein-
stating the former.
75. One court has explained: "In substance, section 1635 vests a continuing power
of rescission in the credit purchaser until three days following delivery of statutorily pre-
scribed disclosures . . . ." Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added). This right, however is now subject to a three year statute of limitations. See
note 64 supra.
One of the recognized principles underlying this right of rescission and the three
day waiting period is that the consumer will shop around to find the best credit terms
available. See note 37 supra. This result has been questioned by commentators on two
grounds. First, it has been argued:
The effectiveness of [the Act] presupposes a consumer who is able to
shop around for the best buys in goods and services. Low income consumers
may be forced by necessity to consider only monthly payments in making pur-
chases and therefore may be unable to seek the best credit terms available.
Garwood, supra note 37, at 502.
Second, it has been suggested that the consumer normally does not read his credit agree-
ment and by the time he does so, if ever, he has become so caught up in the transaction
that he has already decided to make the purchase. See Note, supra note 1, at 107; Com-
ment, supra note 31, at 403. If this proposition was true, the Palmer decision would
presumably have little, if any, effect on creditors subject to the Act.
76. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 374-75
(1973); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1974); N.C. Freed Co.
v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973); Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Co. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838,
841 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. La.
1974); Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 878 (N.D. Ohio 1970). See also C.
SANDS, supra note 49, § 60.01, at 29. The Eby court endorses the application of this
principle to the Act: "The Truth in Lending Act is a remedial statute designed as much
as possible to permit borrowers to make informed judgments about the use of credit. To
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LITERAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT
Other courts have declined to modify the Act judicially and have
adopted a more literal interpretation. The Fifth Circuit took that ap-
proach in deciding Sosa v. Fite.7  In Sosa, an aluminum siding con-
tractor, without making the statutorily required disclosures, induced
one of his customers to sign a document creating a deed of trust on
her home in the name of a savings bank.78 The homeowner made
payments on the loan for almost two years until she became dissatisfied
with the "shoddy craftmanship"; 79 foreclosure and sale of her home to
a third party followed soon thereafter. The homeowner gave the con-
tractor and the savings bank notice of rescission and offered to return
the aluminum siding. When they failed to respond, she successfully
brought suit to enforce rescission of the contract.80 However, the dis-
trict court also entered a judgment for the unpaid balance and
impressed a judgment lien for that amount on her property."1 On ap-
peal, the court concluded that tender by the obligor was not necessary
for rescission of the contract. Instead, rescission was deemed complete
when the creditors were notified of Sosa's intent to rescind.82 Relying
on the trial court's decision in Palmer,3 the court further maintained
that the creditors "were unentitled to any tender at all" since they had
failed to terminate their security interest and to return the obligor's prop-
erty. 4 Adhering to a literal interpretation, the Sosa court argued that
the Act "contemplates an orderly progression of specific events,"'8 5 and
that
section 1635(b) envisions responsive action on the creditor's part to
a rescission notice, after which the debtor then becomes obligated to
effectuate this congressional purpose requires that the Act's terms be liberally con-
strued." 495 F.2d at 650.
77. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974). A jurisdictional question in this case was de-
cided in an earlier opinion. See 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972).
78. 498 F.2d at 116. The deed of trust was in favor of a savings and loan bank
which had financed the home improvement contract.
79. Id. at 116-17.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 121-22. The court further concluded:
[U]pon being notified of her rescission, Fite and Tropical were obligated to
return all monies Sosa had paid, with the statutorily embodied expectation that
upon their further compliance with 1635(b), Sosa would indisputably be obli-
gated to tender either the property or its reasonable value. Id. at 120.
83. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). The Palmer trial court said: "By sending their
notice to defendants, plaintiffs did all that was required of them." 359 F. Supp. at 1102.
This interpretation was, however, reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 502 F.2d at 862-63.
See notes 61-69 supra and accompanying text.
84. 498 F.2d at 118 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
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tender either the property or a sum reflecting its reasonable value. This
precise statutory scheme was abhorted [sic] in this case due to the cred-
itor's failure to comply with statutory requirements, hence Sosa's respon-
sibility to make the specific statutory tender was excused by the
creditors' omissions.86
It is unclear whether the Palmer opinion, which was handed down
after the Sosa decision, would have convinced the Fifth Circuit that
tender might sometimes be required to effect rescission. The Sosa
court did not consider the possibility of conditional rescission since the
consumer tendered when she gave notice of her -intent to rescind.
Thus, even if the Fifth Circuit had conditioned rescission on tender,
the result in Sosa would not have been changed. However, since the
court stated without reservation that "under section 1635 a debtor's
notice of rescission operates ipso facto to abrogate the contract, ''s it
is doubtful that it would ever accept the doctrine of conditional
rescission.
Having determined that the contract had been rescinded, the court
further held that the creditors had forfeited the siding by not claiming
it within ten days of tender by the obligor, thus reversing that part of
the trial court's judgment which required the homeowner to pay the
balance of the loan. 88 The court concluded that since the creditor had
never performed his obligations, the obligor's duty to tender 9 never
86. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 121-22. The court explained: "MiThe section creates legal remedies
which have binding legal effect absent court action." Id. at 121. This is reminiscent
of the traditional rules of rescission at law which provided that a voidable contract could
be rescinded by a debtor without a court decree. See note 19 supra and accompanying
text. The Sosa opinion departed from the common law, however, in that the obligor
need not tender the other party's property in order to effect rescission of the agreement.
On the other hand, the Palmer decision would impose traditional rules requiring tender
in at least some instances.
The Palmer approach is a legitimate means of construction for some statutes, given
the well-accepted rules that statutes in derogation of the common law will be construed
narrowly and will be interpreted with reference to the common law. The difficulty with
this justification, however, is that these rules simply do not apply to this particular set
of circumstances. One commentator has explained: "Although the rule of strict con-
struction appears to load the scales in favor of common law rules against statutory ones,
it is decisive in only a limited number of situations in which there is reasonable doubt
as to the meaning of the statute." 3 C. SANDS, supra note 49, § 61.03, at 51. It is
suggested by this Note that no such reasonable doubt exists.
88. 498 F.2d at 119. Section 1635(b) provides that "[i]f the creditor does not take
possession of the property within ten days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the
property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(b) (1970).
89. The customer must tender the property he received pursuant to the underlying
agreement in specie unless to do so would be impracticable, in which case the reasonable
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arose. 90 The court reasoned that in the absence of a statutorily re-
quired tender, the forfeiture provision is not activated.91 However, the
court was unwilling to permit a lack of cooperation by the creditor to
defeat the consumer's right to forfeiture. It explained that to cut off
the consumer's right for such a reason "would create a gross anomaly,
for no tender in the exact scheme envisioned by the statute could ever
be effected by a debtor in the most egregious of circumstances, namely
when a creditor steadfastly refuses to perform his express obligations
upon receiving the notice of rescission." 92  The court concluded,
therefore, that if the creditor never discharged his obligations but the
consumer tendered the consideration at the same time the notice of
rescission was given, the forfeiture provision would be triggered. The
court conceded, however, that in those cases where the creditor did
perform his obligations, he would be entitled to a new statutory tender
by the consumer before the ten-day forfeiture period would begin
to run. 93
The Fifth Circuit specifically distinguished the Ljepya decision,9t
which ordered conditional rescission, on the basis that the borrowers
value thereof may be substituted. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970); see Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1974). It is contemplated that "the customer must take some af-
firmative action to tender the property to the creditor." Excerpts from FRB Letter of
Oct. 31, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUmE 1 30,205,
at 66,092.
90. "Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations ... the obligor shall ten-
der the [creditor's] property to the creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970).
91. 498 F.2d at 118-19. This is in accord with the court's "orderly progression of
specific events" approach to the Act. The Fifth Circuit held that the obligor's "respon-
sibility to make statutory tender" arises only upon performance by the creditor of his
obligations and that normally the forfeiture provision is activiated only if the obligor's
statutory tender is required.
92. Id. at 119. Given the court's literal interpretation-that forfeiture may never
arise unless the obligor is statutorily required to tender-the principles of judicial modi-
fication of a statute were appropriately applied. When the exact language of a statute
is so narrow as to prevent its remedy from being applied to that which was intended by
Congress, then it may be modified by judicial construction. See note 52 supra and ac-
companying text. The irony here is that the Fifth Circuit's misinterpretation of the stat-
ute is what gave rise to the necessity for modification.
93. Id. at 119 n.6. The court apparently contemplated two requirements for tender.
One would be necessitated by the debtor's obligation to restore the creditor to the status
quo ante. This is an essential element in the rescission of any contract. See notes 15-
16 supra and accompanying text. The other tender would be "statutorily" mandated in
order to avoid a "disruptive commercial stand-off." Id. at 119.
The forfeiture provision seems to'operate as a penalty on the creditor who fails to
meet his obligations under the Act. It certainly cannot be characterized as a device de-
signed to make the consumer whole, for it accomplishes more than that. If the forfei-
ture provision is deemed to be penal, questions arise as to the Eby court's decision. Was
civil liability intended to be an additional penalty, or was it really remedial in nature?
94. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
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in that case had not attempted to return the proceeds of the loan
whereas the homeowner in Sosa had offered to return the siding.95
This effort to distinguish the cases appears to be meaningless. Such
a consideration had no effect on the issue of rescission since the Sosa
court clearly contemplated that the obligor is always entitled to rescind
if he notifies the creditor of his intent to do so.96 At best, the court was
seeking to justify its position that tender at the moment of rescission
will trigger the forfeiture provision even if the creditor never performs
his obligations under the Act.9" Although both Ljepya and Palmer
95. 498 F.2d at 119.
96. See id. at 121-22.
97. The court maintained that the creditors are not "unsuspecting victims of some
complex regulatory entrapment" since they are informed by Federal Reserve Board Reg-
ulations that "no performance of a consumer credit contract be undertaken until the
creditor has reasonably satisfied himself that the customer has not exercised his right
of rescission." Id. at 120.
The right of rescission, of course, may be exercised at any time within three years
of consummation of the credit agreement if the creditor has not properly disclosed the
required information. Id. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. But even if there
has been full disclosure, the consumer may rescind the agreement for a period of three
business days after consummation. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
The regulations state: "A transaction shall be considered consummated at the time
a contractual relationship is created between a creditor and a customer irrespective of
the time of performance of either party." Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) (1974).
Consummation apparently may be effected by (1) obtaining a loan commitment from
the creditor; (2) execution of the loan instrument which may be held in escrow until
the cooling off period has run; (3) execution of a contract entitled "Consummation of
Loan Secured by Real Property (Subject to Rescission by Borrowers)." See Clontz,
Problems Encountered-And Some Solutions: Truth and Confusion in Lending, 87
BANKING L.J. 195, 208 (1970). The position of the Board is that "consummation occurs
when a creditor agrees to extend credit and a customer agrees to utilize consumer credit."
Excerpts from FRB Letter of Aug. 27, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CoN-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,146, at 66,060. In any case, it "follows that you must do
something that would create a contractual relationship, under the laws of your State, in
order to 'consummate the transaction' and be certain that the rescission period has
started." 1 TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL 503[11], at 5-38. See also Wachtel v.
West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1973); Excerpts from FRB Letter of June 19,
1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1[ 30,070, at
66,031-32; Comment, supra note 8, at 127.
The absence of a definitive consummation date may work a hardship on the creditor
who never knows whether or not he has really started the three day rescission period
running. Similarly, if a consumer believes that the agreement has been consummated
before any contractual obligation has arisen, the very purpose of the Act is defeated,
since a security interest in the consumer's residence has not in reality been extended to
the overreaching creditor. That is, until consummation, there is nothing to rescind. If
the consumer thinks that the rescission period has run, even though there has in actuality
been no contract entered into, he is never provided the opportunity to withdraw a secu-
rity interest that has been extended to the creditor. Arguably, some clarifications of con-
summation are needed in order to assure the effectiveness of the right of rescission and
to protect the parties involved. See Burstein 88.
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turned on the issue of effective rescission, Sosa seemed to address their
concern for harshness, but in the context of forfeiture. The Sosa court
stated that the creditors' "lament of any inequity being visited upon
them is utterly unpersuasive, for the power was completely theirs to
prevent this parade of creditor horribles from ever occurring."" This
discussion of equity to the parties imports the concern of a court
modifying the terms of a statute to achieve the results intended by Con-
gress. 9 The Sosa court, of course, thought it accomplished this by al-
lowing tender at the moment of rescission to trigger the forfeiture pro-
vision. 100 Ultimately, however, the court was unimpressed with the
contention that the Act deals harshly with unenergetic creditors: "Con-
gress' intended operation of the statute, as evidenced by the 1635(b)
creditor-forfeiture provision . . .clearly calls for a debtor windfall if
the creditor does not set about to rectify his earlier nondisclosures in
the manner envisaged by the statute."' 01
Another court has embraced the literal interpretation given to the
,rescission and forfeiture provisions of the Act by the Sosa court. In
Hank's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Fisher,"2 an Ohio appellate court applied
all of the adverse provisions of the Act against a creditor who, like the
Sosa creditor, never responded to the consumer's notice of rescission.103
98. 498 F.2d at 120.
99. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 91 supra. The Act requires the creditor to restore the consumer's prop-
erty within ten days after receipt of notice of rescission. At that point, the obligor is
required to tender and the creditor has ten days to take possession of his property. If
the creditor was to perform his obligation under the Act, then tender at the time of
rescission would clearly be ineffective to start the forfeiture provision running since to
do so would allow the consumer to collapse the two separate two-day periods into one.
In that situation, the obligor would be required to tender again if the creditor performed
so that the creditor would be afforded his full opportunity to claim his goods before for-
feiting them to the consumer. If the creditor does not perform within the ten-day pe-
riod, he loses all rights to force the obligor to tender. But if the obligor does tender,
and the creditor fails to claim his property within ten days, the forfeiture provision must
be effective since the very purpose for its existence has been fulfilled-the creditor has
had his full opportunity to claim his property and now must suffer the penalty for leav-
ing the consumer in a position of continuous tender.
101. 498 F.2d at 119. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit with its pro-creditor bias would
have been persuaded by the creditor's lament of inequity in Sosa; the Sosa court was
unpersuaded by it because the creditors failed to carry out their statutory duties.
102. 38 Ohio App. 2d 1, 310 N.E.2d 259 (1973).
103. Even if one were to accept the Palmer doctrine that rescission may be condi-
tioned on tender, the refusal of the creditors in Sosa and Hank's to ever meet their ob-
-ligations on notice of rescission might well suggest that the "equities" would be weighted
in favor of the consumer. Furthermore, in Sosa the creditor was of a type toward whom
the Act was directed. It was suggested, for example, in Gardner & North Roofing &
Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that "[t]he specific
purpose of section 125(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), was to protect homeowners from the
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The consumer set up the Act as a defense to a cognovit note10 4 which
showed an unpaid credit balance of over $400. The court recognized
that it was "constrained to apply the law as it is written" 1 5 and went
unscrupulous business tactics of certain home improvement contractors." Id. at 841.
See also Hearings on S.J. Res. 130, S. 3065 and S. 3066 Before the Senate Commerce
Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Sosa case provided the ideal opportunity for
the court to attack those practices which the Act was intended to curtail.
However, the idea that a more culpable creditor will be subjected to a more strin-
gent interpretation of the Act is not valid. In Ljepya, for example, the creditor was
accused by the court of being involved in a deliberate scheme to confuse the consumer,
yet the court merely ordered conditional rescission. See notes 36-40 supra and accom-
panying text.
104. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1974) provides:
"Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which se-
cures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are
not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real
property mortgages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens
whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar
liens, vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller
in a contract for the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by op-
eration of law, and any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or
performance of an obligation.
Substantial criticism has been directed at the Board's inclusion of cognovit notes and
statutory liens in the definition of "security interest." See 1 TRtuTH-iN-LENDrNG MANUAL
1 5.04[2], at 5-56 to 57 (1973). The argument is essentially that a security interest will
not arise out of a cognovit note or statutory lien until such time as there has been a
default by the obligor. The statute, however, extends the right of rescission only to
credit transactions "in which a security interest is retained or acquired . . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(a) (1970) (emphasis added). This clearly contemplates the present existence
of a security interest rather than the mere possibility that one might arise in the future.
The courts, however, have thus far sustained the Board's authority to employ such
a broad definition of security. In Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board
of Governors, 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court stated that since the Act was
remedial in nature and must therefore be construed broadly,
[a] contract to renovate, remodel or repair a house imports that work will be
done by mechanics and artisans and that materials will be furnished in connec-
tion with that work. Implicit in the contract, therefore, is a provision that a
lien will attach to secure payment for the work and materials ....
We think it a reasonable construction of the statute that Congress in-
tended to require disclosure of all the consequences flowing from the signing
of a home improvement contract, including not only the consequences spelled
out in the contract but also those necessarily inherent therein. Id. at 84142.
In N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 827 (1973), the Second Circuit upheld the Board's definition by pointing out
that in many states a statutory lien (such as a mechanic's lien) relates back to the date
of the making of the contract. The court concluded that "[c]arving statutory liens out
of the protection provided by Section 125(a) would not only render impossible .. . uni-
formity among the states, it would defeat the goal of providing 'meaningful' disclosure
to the consumer. We refuse to perform such a surgical procedure." Id. at 1216; cf.
Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972). See generally Burstein
84; Garwood, supra note 37, at 497-98. A recent amendment to the Act has specifi-
cally included within the purview of the Act any security interest "arising by operation
of law." Pub. L. No. 89-320, § 404(1) (Oct. 28, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635
(1970).
105. 38 Ohio App. 2d at 3, 310 N.E.2d at 262.
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on to hold that the contract was rescinded and that the creditor had
forfeited his property by failing to claim it within ten days of tender.
In addition, the court awarded a civil penalty of $100 and attorneys' fees
of $750.
The Hank's opinion did not discuss the relationship between ten-
der and forfeiture; it only mentioned that the consumer gave notice
of rescission. Since the creditor never responded, the act of giving
notice seems to have been sufficient to trigger the forfeiture provi-
sion.106 This decision represents the toughest stance yet against a
creditor, and cannot be reconciled with either Palmer or Sosa since ap-
parently no tender was ever made.' Such a stance clearly punishes
those creditors who believe that if they disregard the Act, it will go
away. Undoubtedly, its effect is shocking to many creditors, but such
a shock is probably necessary if the substantial realignment of the
debtor-creditor relationship mandated by the Act is to take place.
C01DITIONAL RESCISSION AND CREDITOR FORFEITURE
In the beginning of this Note, the example of a consumer who
bought $2,000 worth of storm windows was used to illustrate the basic
elements of the rescission provision. 0 8 This example will be useful
now to point out the uncertainties that recent cases have created.
Suppose that the consumer did nothing more than notify the cred-
itor of his intent to rescind and that the creditor did not respond.
Hank's would suggest that the full panoply of enforcement provisions-
rescission, forfeiture, civil penalty, and attorney fees-should be
imposed.0 9 The Sosa decision would allow the contract to be re-
scinded on notice by the consumer but would not invoke forfeiture
106. It is interesting to note the different problems recognized by the Sosa and
Hank's courts. In Sosa, the Fifth Circuit apparently felt that some sort of modification
or loose interpretation of the Act was necessary to start the forfeiture provision running.
On the other hand, the Hank's court expressed no such hesitancy and interpreted the
Act as providing for forfeiture any time the creditor fails to respond to a consumer's
tender.
107. The Palmer decision would apparently accept the argument that, in appropriate
cases, a credit agreement may be rescinded without tender by the consumer. 502 F.2d
at 862. Sosa, however, clearly stands for the proposition that the obligor must at some
time offer to restore the creditor to his status quo ante before the forfeiture provision
will be triggered. 498 F.2d at 119. Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how the ten-day
period that creditors are allowed in which to claim their property fulfills its function
if tender is never required. Very possibly, this was a misinterpretation by the Hank's
court.
108. See text accompanying note 20 supra.




since that provision is not triggered until tender by the obligor.110 For
purposes of the hypothetical, assume that in an effort to comply with
Sosa the consumer tendered the storm windows to the creditor ten days
after notice of rescission but still received no reply. A court following
the Palmer-Ljepya rationale might reason that since the consumer did
not tender the storm windows when he notified the creditor of his intent
to rescind, the contract was not rescinded and the creditor cannot be
forced to forfeit his property."'
Such reasoning leaves the consumer in the untenable situation of
exercising his right of rescission without knowing whether the court will
subsequently cut off the forfeiture provision by holding the rescission
to be ineffective due to the absence of tender at the time of the notice
of rescission. Similarly, the creditor is left in a quandary as to whether
or not he should ignore the notice of rescission and subsequent tender
by the obligor in the hope that the court will hold that the notice of
rescission was ineffective to void the creditor's security interest.
The Palmer and Sosa decisions would indicate that the only means
by which a consumer can be sure of having available to him the for-
feiture provision is always to tender at the moment of rescission. The
irony in this is that it returns the consumer to the disadvantageous posi-
tion he suffered before the Act became effective.'12 The contract may
be rescinded, but the creditor has both his own property as well as
the consumer's consideration in his possession. The consumer then
must bear the burden of litigating to force the restoration of his prop-
erty and at the same time assume the risk of creditor insolvency. This
clearly was not the purpose of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The contradictory positions adopted in Palmer and Sosa have left
the Act's rescission provision in an uncertain state. It is essential,
therefore, that the Federal Reserve Board adopt regulations"13 which
110. 498 F.2d at 119. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1974); Ljepya v. M.L.S.C.
Properties, 353 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
112. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
113. The Board is empowered to issue regulations by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § 1604
(1970):
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this sub-
chapter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations,
or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for
any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention
or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
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state that tender may never be a condition of rescission but is always
a prerequisite to forfeiture. This would essentially result in rejecting
the Palmer and Ljepya decisions on rescission and the Hank's position
on forfeiture, while adopting the Sosa interpretation on both issues.
Although the courts are not bound by the Board's regulations, the reg-
ulations certainly are accorded significant weight." 4  At a minimum,
such regulations might force a Supreme Court decision on the issues
which now remain unsettled. Until a definitive answer by the appro-
priate authority removes the consumers' uncertainties as to his obliga-
tions and remedies under the Act, overreaching creditors will continue
to evade the requirements of full disclosure.
Griffith L. Garwood, an advisor to the Legal Division of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, has pointed out in a recent article that although the
Board is authorized to issue regulations which are enforced by a number of different
agencies, see 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970), the interpretations of the regulations offered by
the Board are not always followed by the courts. See Garwood, supra note 37, at 493-
94. Although the courts may lend great weight to the Board's own interpretations, such
opinions do not have the force of law. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
329 F. Supp. 270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Indeed, for the regulations themselves to
be given effect by the judiciary, they must be "reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation." Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973), citing Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969). See gener-
ally Garwood, Truth-in-Lending After Two Years, 89 BANKING L.J. 3, 8 (1972); Com-
ment, supra note 31, at 391 n.18; Note, Consumer Protection-Truth-in-Lending Disclo-
sures Not Timely at Closing, 51 N.C.L. REv. 592 (1973).
114. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 278-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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